Singapore Insurance Law Round-up (July-Sept 2026)

A round up of our social media posts tracking developments in Singapore insurance law from July to September 2026.

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Changes to Retirement and Re-employment Ages – 1 July 2026

A reminder to lawyers computing loss of earnings claims, from 1 July 2026, the statutory retirement age in Singapore is now 64 and the re-employment age is now 69.

International Maritime Organization Adopts Singapore-led Resolution on the Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes - 10 July 2026

The resolution reaffirms the importance of upholding and respecting navigational rights and freedoms for commercial ships when transiting through vital shipping lanes, including straits used for international navigation, in accordance with international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Homeowner’s insurers see off High Court appeal -Gurpreet Gill Maag v Chubb Insurance Singapore Ltd [2026] SGHC 143

The appellant, Mrs Maag, was insured with the respondent’s homeowner’s policy. Mrs Maag was sued in a counterclaim, which alleged that Mrs Maag spoke defamatory words about a Mr McKee during a meeting. She sought to enforce the defence coverage clause in the policy. Chubb relied on two policy exclusions (the Business Pursuits Exclusion and the Director’s Liability Exclusion) to argue that the duty to indemnify had not arisen.

 At first instance, the District Judge held that the exclusions applied and there was no duty to indemnity. The High Court agreed.

Of particular interest was that Mrs Magg argued on appeal that an insurer’s defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.  She cited the Canadian case of Seeton v Commercial Union Assurance Co of Canada [2006] ILR I-4515.

The Singapore Court rejected Mrs Maag’s arguments. In doing so, the Court drew the following points from Seeton (and cases cited in Seeton).

(a)  The duty to defend is related to the duty to indemnify. Absent express language to the contrary, the duty to defend extends only to claims that could potentially trigger indemnity under the policy.
(b)  The exclusion clauses of the policy may indirectly condition the scope of the duty to defend, in so far as they define the scope of coverage.
(c)  Where the insurer relies on an exclusion clause to avoid the obligation to defend its insured, the insurer must prove that there can be no indemnity under the policy. The allegations of fact in that action must be given a wide interpretation and must be considered as capable of being proven. It is on that basis that the insurer must prove the application of the exclusion clause in the policy
(d)  Where it is clear from the pleadings that the suit falls outside the coverage of the policy by reason of an exclusion clause, the duty to defend does not arise.
(e) However, where a claim falls within the coverage of the policy, it is not necessary to prove that the obligation to indemnify will in fact arise in order to trigger the duty to defend. The mere possibility that a claim within the policy may succeed suffices.

Court in industrial accident case rejects claimants use of res ipsa loquitur - Lin Mien Lee v T.S.&T. Construction Pte Ltd [2026] SGDC 219.

The Claimant pleaded that when she alighted from a taxi along Peck Seah Street, a heated tarmac particle flew from the Defendant's worksite and injured her eye. She claimed that the Works were being carried out with “no cover, cordoning and/or barricading”. The Claimant also pleaded that she “shall rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor on the injuries that were caused to the Claimant in the Accident.”

The Defendant denied that the Claimant had been injured in an Accident as pleaded. The Defendant has also averred that in the course of carrying out the Works, various measures had been taken by the Defendant to ensure the reasonable safety of pedestrians and other road users.

During cross examination the Claimant testified that "something flew inside my eyes and I felt the pain. I suspect it might be the material from the pictures". The Claimant then testified that she did not try to remove the particle after it supposedly entered her eye and she also did not directly answer a question as to whether she had seen the tarmac particle, choosing instead to repeat that she “just felt something went into [her] eye.”

The Court held that the Claimant has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that a particle from the Worksite entered her eye. Her own evidence was not based on first-hand knowledge of the Accident, but was essentially an inference drawn from other sources of information. Further, the medical evidence did not demonstrate that any particle, whether from the Worksite or elsewhere, had entered the Claimant’s left eye as pleaded

The Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not assisted the Claimant. The DR opined that res ipsa loquitur does not operate so as to prove an accident occurred.

Lessons from the latest High Court costs decision of Chong Jorina v Ritz Property Investimentos Imobiliarios Ltd and another [2026] SGHC 148

The Claimant’s claim was dismissed. The Defendants sought costs of $270,000. The Claimant argued that $140,000 was reasonable, raising various arguments. The Court fixed costs at $215,000. This is what the Court said about the Claimant’s arguments:
 
1️⃣ The Defendant’s proposed costs were more than 1/3 higher than the Costs guidelines and were therefore essentially seeking indemnity costs.
 
The argument was premised on indemnity costs typically being 1/3 higher than standard costs. The Judge said this was a rule of thumb only. Here, costs were being assessed on a standard basis. The difference between standard and indemnity costs lies in the burden of proof in establishing reasonableness. “The conventional one-third uplift on standard costs to arrive at indemnity costs is merely a rule of thumb used to quantify the practical effect of that shift in the burden of proof.”

The Costs Guidelines are merely guidelines. They are “neither a tariff nor a ceiling”. They are a “starting point”, but the court can depart from them.  There were 3 features of the case that added complexity and warranted a (limited) departure from the Costs Guidelines (a) the volume of the documentary material; (b) two specific legal complexities (i.e. novel questions of law a pleading that there was a conspiracy); and (c) the three causes of action that the claimant advanced on her pleadings.

2️⃣ Quantum of the costs

For pre-trial work, the court departed from the costs guidelines and awarded $85,000. This took into account the volume of documents and length of the AEICs.

For the 5 day trial, a daily rate of $16,000 was awarded. This was the top end of the guidelines. The court did not accept the Claimant’s argument that the Defendant should be penalised for having three solicitors attend the hearing.

For post-trial work, $50,000 was awarded. Whilst this was above the guideline figure, both parties had advanced this amount in their submissions.

3️⃣ Should the Defendant be deprived of her costs because the Claimant had made settlement overtures before trial?

There was a mediation and two exchanges of settlement terms prior to trial. Disappointingly, the High Court did not take these into account. No weight was placed on the negotiations as there was no evidence before the court for the judge to assess whether the Defendant acted reasonably in rejecting them. Further, the Claimant lost the trial outright. Thus whether the claimant was or was not genuine in making or participating in these settlement overtures is no longer to the point as events have demonstrated that the Defendant was correct, and therefore acted reasonably, in rejecting the offers.

4️⃣ Should the Defendant be deprived of her costs because of her conduct in giving poor oral evidence at trial and in not complying with certain disclosure orders.

In the 2022 Comfort Management decision, the court set out a frame work for when a litigant could be deprived of costs. A “Type I” costs order deprives a successful party of all or part of her costs. A “Type II” costs order goes further and requires the successful party to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.

The Judge opined that the Comfort Management framework continues to apply to the new Rules of Court. In the Judge’s view, the discretion to make a Type I order under each limb of Order 21 rule 4 of the Rules ought generally to be exercised only to the extent that the successful party’s conduct falling within that limb has increased unreasonably the costs that the successful party has incurred and is seeking to recover from the unsuccessful party.

For the complaint about the Defendant’s evidence, Order 21 rule 4 should not apply. This is because the rule is to punish a party for the way that he/she has conducted the litigation rather than the way that he/she has given evidence.

For the complaint about non compliance with a costs order, Order 21 rule 4 could apply. But only if the breached had unreasonably increased the costs that the unsuccessful party must now bear. On the facts, the breaches did not increase costs unreasonably.

Court recognises that an MSCT has a duty to keep the common property ground soil free from subterranean termites - Glenford Tan Ming Loon & Anor v MCST Plan No 2823 [2026] SGMC 88.

The Claimants were subsidiary proprietors of 61 Sunset Way. They sued the MCST for damages arising from a termite infestation.

The claimants’ case is that the defendant breached its statutory duties under s 29(1)(a) and (b) of the Building Strata Management Act 2004 (“BSMA”) and its common law duty of care by failing to ensure that the common property ground soil of the Development was free from subterranean termites nesting in or traversing through it. The defendant has also failed to undertake all anti-termite treatment to the common property ground soil.

Evidence showed that there was subterranean termite activity across the common property of the condo and that the termites had caused damage to the Claimants' units.

In Singapore it is established that the defendant owed a duty to take reasonable steps in the maintenance of common property (see for example MCST Plan No 3602 v MacFadden, Declan Pearse [2022] 4 SLR 623).

Here, the Defendant knew that there had been termites in the past and that they could return and cause damage. Thus the defendant has a duty to take reasonable steps to keep the common property ground soil free from subterranean termites.

In support, the court noted that in Australian case of Wildwood Gardens [2025] QBCCMCmr 43, at [58] it has been held that the statutory duty to maintain common property has been interpreted to require works that may be reasonably expected to minimise future maintenance works, ie, preventative maintenance.

The court found that the defendant has breached its duty under s 29(1)(b) of the BSMA.  The court ordered the defendant to pay damages of $10,978.00 plus costs and disbursements

Court of Appeal explains the basic principles that undergird the law of negligence - Deloitte & Touche LLP v Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) [2026] SGCA 33

The appeal arose from the collapse of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd ("HLT"). The liquidators of HLT have alleged that HLT's former auditors, Deloitte, were negligent. In the court below, Deloitte sought to strike out HLT’s claims on a variety of grounds. Deloitte was largely unsuccessful and brought the present appeal.

The appeal was successful in part, but the Court of Appeal was dissatisfied with how parties approached the case, raising concerns that some parts of the case appear to have been founded on some fundamental misconceptions. 😱

The Court of Appeal thus went into the basic principles that undergird the law of negligence. Of note:

➡️ Stapleton's 5 broad requirements apply - (i) the subject matter of the complaint must be of a type that is actionable in the tort of negligence (ii)
the defendant must owe the claimant a duty of care (iii) the conduct of the defendant must have constituted a breach of his duty of care (iv) the defendant’s breach of duty must be a factual cause of the injury which the claimant complains of (v) the injury which the claimant complains of is not too remote in the sense that it falls within the normatively appropriate scope of the defendant’s legal responsibility.

➡️ In Singapore, the framework applied by our courts to determine the existence of a duty of care is that set out in this court’s decision in Spandeck. There is a common tendency for parties and courts to conflate the existence of a duty of care with the issues of breach and/or causation.

➡️ Breach of duty is a question of act. It is a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care so that injury or loss is not caused to the claimant, and not a duty to do any specific act or acts. Reasonable skill and care may require a defendant to take a certain course of action in the circumstances at hand, but the need to take such action is incidental to the duty of care rather than a duty in and of itself. Thus, when a claimant frames an allegation of breach of duty, the ultimate question that has to be decided is not whether the defendant failed to do any specific thing but whether the failure to do a certain thing constituted a failure to act with due skill and care.

➡️Causation is often a thicket of complex factual, legal and policy issues. The court must look at (i) the causal relevance of the defendant’s wrongful conduct to the claimant’s loss and (ii) the extent of the loss for which the defendant ought to be liable. Stage (i) is a question of fact that is typically expressed in terms of a test of “but for” causation. The first stage is easy to satisfy. Stage (ii) limits the over-inclusiveness of the first stage by requiring the court to make a “value judgment” as to the appropriate scope of the defendant’s legal responsibility

High Court confirms the framework the court should use when considering whether to allow amendment of pleadings - Pacific Healthcare Holdings Ltd and another v Precious Surgery Centre Pte Ltd and another and another suit [2026] SGHCR 25

In the Pacific Healthcare case, the High Court said that the three stage analytic framework set out in Wang Piao v Lee Wee Ching [2024] 4 SLR 540 should be used when assessing whether to allow amendment of pleadings. This framework had originally applied to the old 2014 Rules of Court. It now applies to the 2021 Rules.

The framework as 3 stages as follows

(a) First, the court should determine the stage of proceedings at which the amendments are sought. This would affect how the general principles apply. More broadly, the later an application is made, the stronger would be the grounds required to justify it.

(b) Second, the court should consider whether the amendments sought would enable the real question or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined. It is relevant to consider whether the application is made in good faith, and whether the proposed amendments are material.

(c) Third, the court should consider whether it is just to allow the amendments, by assessing, eg, whether the amendments would cause any prejudice to the other party which cannot be compensated in costs, and whether the applying party is effectively asking for a second bite of the cherry.

Responsible AI Training – 20 July 2026

From 20 July 2026, organisations in Singapore will need to inform consumers when they use personal data to train generative artificial intelligence models, as the nation seeks to promote greater transparency and accountability.

Court of Appeal provides guidance on how to approach a limitation defence - Kuvera Properties Pte Ltd v Far East Opus Pte Ltd [2026] SGCA 34

When it applies, a time bar is a complete defence to a claim. Because of the procedural nature of limitation period, they do not operate automatically but must be specifically pleaded:

According to the CA, when a court is faced with a claim that the claimant’s action has been commenced out of time due to the operation of a limitation period, the court should adopt a systematic approach that considers the following issues in order:
(a) First, the court should identify the cause(s) of action which the claimant has advanced.
(b) Second, the court should identify the applicable limitation period(s) (if any) for the cause(s) of action that the claimant has advanced.
(c) Third, the court should consider when the limitation period(s) started to run against the claimant for the cause(s) of action advanced.
(d) Fourth, the court should determine whether the claimant had commenced its action for its cause(s) of action within the limitation period(s).

The Court also looked at the interplay between Sections 6 and 24A of the Limitation Act. Section 6 sets out 6-year time bar for torts, and the CA opined that this could be applied to claims under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act as mis-rep is an action founded on tort. However, one could also frame a claim as a "breach of duty" under Section 24A (which sets out a 3 year time bar).

The court was of the view that s 24A does not completely displace s 6(1) such that it remains possible, if a claimant wishes, to rely on s 6(1) read with another provision in Part 3 if that produces a more favourable outcome than s 24A(3)(b).

High Court issues caution to practitioners not to allow witnesses to repackage their evidence in their AEICs - Goh Bin Seng v Yeo Neng Jian Stephen and others [2026] SGHC 157

“115 It appears that the defendants took the evidence of their witnesses and repackaged it in their AEICs in a manner that would present the most convenient narrative for trial. This went beyond including Mr Ong’s testimony concerning matters not within Mr Yeo’s personal knowledge into Mr Yeo’s AEIC. There were also various parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which were admissible as they dealt with matters within his personal knowledge, but in which Mr Yeo also sought to confirm the accounts given by other witnesses. Mr Yeo admitted that he had the opportunity to review other witnesses’ AEICs before affirming his own, and this was the reason why he was able to make extensive cross-references to the AEICs of other witnesses in his own AEIC.  Needless to say, this raises similar concerns as to the independence, credibility and reliability of the testimony put before the court. Such a practice must be firmly discouraged as it serves to ensure alignment of narratives through contamination and influence, instead of assisting the court to ascertain the truth of what actually transpired between parties. In light of the irregularities in how his AEIC was prepared, I also accord little weight to the parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which sought to align his evidence with that of the other witnesses for the defendants.”

High Court issues caution to practitioners not to allow witnesses to repackage their evidence in their AEICs - Goh Bin Seng v Yeo Neng Jian Stephen and others [2026] SGHC 157

“115 It appears that the defendants took the evidence of their witnesses and repackaged it in their AEICs in a manner that would present the most convenient narrative for trial. This went beyond including Mr Ong’s testimony concerning matters not within Mr Yeo’s personal knowledge into Mr Yeo’s AEIC. There were also various parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which were admissible as they dealt with matters within his personal knowledge, but in which Mr Yeo also sought to confirm the accounts given by other witnesses. Mr Yeo admitted that he had the opportunity to review other witnesses’ AEICs before affirming his own, and this was the reason why he was able to make extensive cross-references to the AEICs of other witnesses in his own AEIC.  Needless to say, this raises similar concerns as to the independence, credibility and reliability of the testimony put before the court. Such a practice must be firmly discouraged as it serves to ensure alignment of narratives through contamination and influence, instead of assisting the court to ascertain the truth of what actually transpired between parties. In light of the irregularities in how his AEIC was prepared, I also accord little weight to the parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which sought to align his evidence with that of the other witnesses for the defendants.”

Claimant Fails to Establish that RTA had Caused Extent of Injury and Medical Expenses Claimed - Kua Li Chuen V Lim Ten Yu T/A Liquid Formulas [2026] SGDC 242

The Claimant was involved in a road traffic accident on 18 May 2023 and claimed to have suffered a neck strain and lower back injury. Liability was conceded and consent interlocutory judgment was entered 100% in the Claimant’s favour but with the issues of causation, damages, interest and costs reserved to the Registrar assessing the damages.

At the Assessment of Damages hearing the nature of the Claimant’s back injury and the appropriate treatment were hotly disputed.

The Claimant said that she had suffered a aggravation or exacerbation of her pre-existing lumbar spondylosis and sought $15,000. The Defendant took the position that the lower back injury was confined to the muscle or ligaments around the joint and the pre-existing degenerative disorder was an incidental finding picked up by the MRI scans. The Defendant submitted that $2,500 was adequate for damages.

The court found the Defendant’s expert to be more persuasive as his analysis focused on the clinical findings as well as the MRI results. DR Gloria Lee awarded $3,500.

For the neck injury the DR awarded $1,500.

For medical expenses, there was a dispute as to whether the Claimant should be reimbursed all of the expenses that she had incurred. The DR noted that medical expenses are claimable “if they relate to the injuries suffered” by the Claimant. That means a causal link must be shown. If an injury was causally related to the accident, the medical expenses incurred remain recoverable even if the treatment or advice was subsequently found to be wrong, provided it was obtained in good faith from a reputable medical professional. However, medical expenses have to be reasonably incurred, and the Claimant is under the usual duty to mitigate the loss.

The DR assessed the various expenses and held that only $12,538.45 should be reimbursed out of a claim of $51,660.27.

Court upholds injection of performance bond - SH Design & Build Pte Ltd v Jurong Port Pte Ltd and HSBC Life (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 159

This case concerned whether Jurong Port, the employer, was entitled to call on a performance bond issued in its favour by HSBC, following disputes with its contractor, SH Design & Build Pte Ltd (“SHDB”). The High Court held that the call on the performance bond was invalid and restrained payment under the bond

SHDB was engaged by Jurong Port to carry out construction works for the “Proposed Ready Mixed Concrete Ecosystem at Jurong Port”, under a contract incorporating the Public Sector Standard Conditions of Contract for Construction Works (PSSCOC).

A key feature of the contract was the requirement for SHDB to provide security equal to 10% of the contract sum. Instead of a cash deposit, SHDB furnished a performance bond issued by HSBC Life for S$12,569,800. The bond was a conditional performance bond, meaning that payment would only become due if the contractual requirements for a valid claim were met. The requirements for this bond required Jurong Port to provide written notice of claim and identify the contractor’s failure to fulfil the contract.

The dispute arose after Jurong Port refused SHDB’s progress payment on the basis that SHDB had delayed the works and was liable for substantial liquidated damages. Jurong Port also called on the bond.

On 6 August 2025, Jurong Port referred the dispute to the Supervising Officer (“SO”) under clause 35.1 of the PSSCOC.  It asked the SO to determine the total amount of liquidated damages payable by SHDB.

The PSSCOC required the SO to make a determination within 30 days. The SO met this timeline but rather than determining the amount of liquidated damages, he stated that he did not have the contractual power to decide the issue!

Jurong Port then on both the decision and on a later clarification to call on the bond.

The High Court held that the SO’s letter was not a valid determination of the liquidated damages payable. As there was no valid determination, the prerequisites for the bond call were not met.  Consequently, HSBC was not obliged to pay, and the injunction restraining the call on the bond was maintained.

Whose loss is it? Ng Gino Ernest v Ang Eng Peng [2026] SGDC 261

The claimant was a physiotherapist who was a director and 50% shareholder of his owner physiotherapy clinic.  He was injured whilst cycling along Nicol Highway when the defendant, who was riding a (insured) motorcycle, collided with him.

Default interlocutory judgment was entered against the defendant. The matter then proceeded to a contested assessment of damages hearing.

The Deputy Registrar assessed damages at $55,769.23, but awarded nil for pre- and post- trial loss of earnings. This was on the basis that the losses belonged to the clinic and not the claimant. The claimant appealed.

The District Judge upheld the first instance decision. The Judge noted that “the onus lies squarely on the claimant to prove that his earnings were factually reduced because of his injuries”, but that there was “no evidence of any such reduction of earnings after the Accident”. This was because the claimant only showed his income for 2018-2021(the accident was in Sept 2021). There was a wider spread of evidence of the company’s earnings but these did not show any clear decease. In fact, the DJ noted that the DR had “found that the claimant on average, treated more patients and generated more revenue monthly after the Accident than before”. More fundamentally, any loss of earnings belonged to the company rather than to the claimant as he continued to draw the same monthly salary post-accident.

The company is a wholly separate legal entity from the claimant. Thus the claimant cannot made a claim on behalf the company. Conversely, the company cannot claim for its losses in this action. The judge said that this is an “ insurmountable huddle” for the claimant.

Court holds that the subrogation right in section 9(9) MVTPA can only be exercised against party whose liability the insurer has paid out to discharge – AIG Asia Pacific Insurance Pte Ltd v Tay Kim Bock & Anor [2026] SGMC 103

In this case, AIG (as motor insurer) had repudiated cover for a personal injury claim arising from a road traffic accident. This was on the basis that there was late notification of the accident and because the vehicle was believed to have been used in a way which breached the terms of the insurance.

Notwithstanding the repudiation, AIG had a statutory duty to satisfy the judgment sum which the injured pedestrian obtained against the driver of the car.

AIG sought to recover the judgment sum plus their legal costs from the owner of the car (1st Defendant) and the driver of the car (2nd Defendant).

The 2nd Defendant did not enter a Notice of Intention to Contest or Not Contest and a Default Judgment was entered against him. The 1st Defendant contested the claim and the matter went for trial.

The District Judge held that AIG were not entitled to recover the judgment sum from the 1st Defendant. This is because section 9(9) of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks and Compensation) Act only provides a right to recover the judgment sum from the person whose liability payment was made to discharge. Whilst there was a more broadly worded recovery clause in the insurance policy, the Judge was of the view that Section 9(9) constrained the interpretation of the clause. Because the injured pedestrian only obtained judgment against the 2nd Defendant, AIG could not recover the judgment sum form the 1st Defendant.

The District Judge opined that this interpretation of Section 9(9) was consistent with the conceptual treatment of a motor policy as having two separate covers – one for the owner and one for the driver. It was also consistent with the position where an insurer becomes liability to pay pursuant to the MIB Principal Agreement.

The District Judge went on to observe that the right of recovery in Section 9(9) does not include a right to recover the solicitor and client costs paid by an insurer. The reference to costs in Section 9(9) refers only to costs payable to the person entitled to the benefit of the judgment.

Lessons from Cai Yanhong v Prudential Assurance Company Singapore (Pte) Limited [2026] SGDC 276

The Claimant was insured under a life insurance policy issued by the Defendant through Standard Chartered Bank. The policy provided different classes of cover, including Early Crisis Cover.

The dispute was whether the policy responded to the endovascular repair of a subarachnoid haemorrhage arising from a ruptured anterior communicating artery aneurysm. The Defendant's position was that Section 32 of the policy defined brain aneurysm surgery and contained a statement saying that “endovascular repair or procedures are not covered”.

The District Judge held that there was no cover.

👉 The Judge commenced his analysis by restating that the interpretation of contracts is based on the “objective principle”. Extrinsic evidence can be referred to but only insofar as Section 94 of the Evidence Act permits. Thus the court considered the proposal form, certificate of insurance, the policy wording, an approval letter, a product summary and witness testimony.

👉 The Judge then examined the text of the whole contract taking into account the interpretive presumption against redundant words. He concluded that the meaning of the term “diagnosed” in section 17.2 must be informed by the phrase “as having any one of the Medical Conditions listed”, as the latter phrase circumscribes the former term. The Judge considered that the wording was not ambiguous and therefore declined to apply the principle of contra proferentem.

👉 The Defendant had exhibited policies written by its competitors, but the Judge was of the view that these did not assist the court in deciding the key issue in dispute in this case.

👉 The next part of the judgment concerned whether there was a duty on the Defendant to have drawn the Claimant's attention to the relevant provisions. The Judge was unclear whether this duty applied. In any event, if the principle applied the Defendant did not (on the facts) fail to adequately bring the relevant clause to the Claimant's attention. In the Proposal Form, the Claimant confirmed that a copy of the product summary had been provided to her and that the contents thereof had been explained to her and to her satisfaction. This was significant because the summary contained provisions that were effectively identical to provisions in sections 17.2, 17.2.4 and 32 of the policy.

👉 The Judge then went on to find that the Defendant had not breached the duty of uberrimae fidei and also that any breach of an MAS Notice by the Defendant would not be actionable by the Claimant. The Judge also found that there was no basis for the Claimant's claim that the SCB insurance salesman was acting as the Defendant's agent during the sale. If anything, SCB had been acting as her agent, but this was beyond the scope of the pleadings.

By virtue of the foregoing, the Claimant’s claim was dismissed.

Indemnity costs awarded to punish Defendant's conduct - James Jonathan v Adel Ng [2026] SGMC 106

In this case the Claimant was seeking the return of $6,650 which he had erroneously transferred to the Defendant's account.

The parties were acquainted with one another so the Claimant emailed the Defendant to seek the return of the money. The emails went unanswered until a letter of demand was sent. The Claimant appointed lawyers and instructed the lawyers to seek extensive discovery of identity related documents from the Claimant. In the meanwhile the Defendant paid the funds over to the police. Later, during the conduct of the suit, the Defendant took out a striking out application that was ill-conceived and without merit. Defendant also made grave allegations both against the Claimant and the Claimant’s solicitors, which resulted in the need for an in-person case conference to be called on short notice.

In her defence, the Defendant pointed to her attempts to settle the case amicably. The Court did not accept that her offers were genuine enough to be taken into account. The following observations were made about these offers:

i. "In the first offer of amicable resolution contained in a letter from the Defendant dated 27 March 2026, the Defendant continued to make serious allegations against the Claimant including that “the proceedings were brought against her unnecessarily and for improper motive”, and that the “Claimant’s commencement of these proceedings are an abuse of process”. It is difficult to see how the Defendant could have believed that this letter would have actually facilitated an amicable settlement.
ii. The second letter relied on by the Defendant is a letter dated 7 May 2026, where three paragraphs were dedicated to reiterating why the Defendant believed that the Claimant’s claim is not made out. Additionally, while the Defendant proposes that the matter be resolved with no orders as to costs, the Defendant equivocates in the subsequent paragraph stating that “we may be able to persuade our client to forgo any claim against yours … Indicatively, the Defendant estimates her costs at $5,800 at this juncture…” [emphasis added in underline]. At best, the offer being made was confusing, and at worst, contradictory.
iii. The third correspondence relied on by the Defendant is an email sent on 15 June 2026 attaching a draft consent order with terms which the Court accepts is close to the version eventually agreed upon at the hearing on 19 June 2026. However, it was followed just one day later on 16 June 2026 with the Defendant’s letter to court containing the grave allegations against the Claimant and the Claimant’s solicitors."

The Court fixed costs of the whole action on an indemnity basis at $6,500 plus GST.

Policyholder fails in bid to extend the contractual time bar embedded in their fire policy - Far Ocean Sea Products Pte Ltd v United Overseas Insurance Ltd [2026] SGHC 182.

The Policyholder's business premises suffered fire damage on 28 June 2024 and UOI was duly notified.

The policy contained a time bar which stated that the insurer would not be liable for any loss of damage after 12 months of the loss event UNLESS the claim was subject to a pending action or arbitration. The policy also contained an arbitration clause which provided that if there was any difference in opinion "as to the amount to be paid under this Policy (liability otherwise admitted) such difference shall be referred to an arbitrator".

Investigations into the fire and negotiations were protracted and the 12 month time bar came and went.

In December 2025, UOI invoked the 12 month time bar. At this time, no litigation or arbitration had been commenced.

The Policyholder sought to extend the time bar for commencing arbitration using Section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act. Section 10(1) grants the court the power to extend a time bar if (1) a dispute has arisen which is governed by an arbitration clause and (2) the court is of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship if an extension was not given.

The application failed. The High Court was of the opinion that the phrase “liability being otherwise admitted” in the arbitration clause should be interpreted as requiring that liability be wholly admitted by the insurer such that only mere questions of quantum remain. On the facts, liability had not been admitted and so the arbitration agreement had not become operative. That being so, the Court did not have the power to extend the time bar using Section 10(1).

Negligence and defamation claims against insurance company for providing inaccurate employee verification records fail - Chua Kim Chuan v HSBC Life (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 189

The Claimant in this case was seeking employment with an agency operating under Prudential Assurance Singapore Pte Ltd. As part of the recruitment process, the agency engaged Sterling RISQ to do background checks on the Claimant. Sterling RISQ sent an employment verification response (EVR) form to the Claimant’s previous employers, including HSBC Life.

The Claimant alleged that there were 2 errors in the response provided by HSBC Life. The first was that the Claimant had left their employment due to “involuntary resignation” and the second was that there had been a “failure to complete fit and proper exercise”. He therefore sued HSBC Life in the torts of negligence and defamation.

For the negligence claim the Claimant needed to show the existence of a duty of care, that the duty had been breached and that the breach had caused a loss.

The Court held that the subject matter of Complainant’s complaint is of a type that is actionable in the tort of negligence. Further, the claim is for economic loss, which is a well-established form of actionable damage. The Court then held that, by failing to verify its electronic records against its physical records before providing the information to Sterling RISQ, HSBC Life had failed to exercise reasonable skill and care so that injury is not caused to the Claimant.  But the Claimant failed to show that the EVR factually caused him to lose a real chance to be employed by Prudential. Therefore the claim failed.

The Claimant had also pleaded a broader case against HSBC Life – that they were negligent in disclosing or disseminating information to his other prospective employers between 2009 and 21 February 2023. The court held that any claims earlier than 16 August 2009 were time-barred under the 15 year longstop in Section 24B of the Limitation Act.  For the claims that were not time-barred, the issue was a lack of evidence. The claims ultimately failed.

For the defamation claim, the claimant needed to show (a) a statement bearing a defamatory meaning, (b) publication to a third party and (c) reference made to the claimant. A statement is considered defamatory if it (a) lowers the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, (b) causes the claimant to be shunned or avoided or (c) exposes the claimant to hatred, contempt or ridicule.

The Court held that the statement that the Claimant had failed the ‘fit and proper exercise’ would lower him in the eyes of prospective employers in the financial advisory and insurance industry. However, since employment references generally attract qualified privilege, the Claimant also needed to show that there was malice in the publication. This he failed to do. The Claimant’s claim was thus dismissed

Singapore Court considers abatement of rent as recoverable damages for the first time- Eomer Holding Pte Ltd v June Lim Lay Peng & Anor [2026] SGMC 111

In this case, the Claimants were the tenants of a three storey shophouse. Starting in June 2023 the roof of the premises started to leak which the Claimant’s said rendered the top floor unusable. The leak was repaired by the landlord in October 223. The Claimants sought damages for loss of business and diversion of manpower during the water leak period. As an alternative to damages for loss of income, the claimant contended that they were entitled to damages for inconvenience, anxiety and loss of enjoyment.

The Defendant counterclaimed for unpaid rent and also sought damages for the Claimant’s failure to buy fire insurance in the landlord’s sole name (the policy purchased was in the name of both tenant and landlord).

☔ The court found that the landlord was in breach of its obligation to keep the premises in good tenantable repair and that this had caused the top floor to be unusable for several months. The court held that the appropriate remedy was a proportionate reduction of rent to be computed with reference to the floor area rendered unusable by the defendants’ breach. The court noted that whilst damages for partial loss of use a rented property have not been awarded based on abatement locally, the principle has been applied in the context of the sale of property. Further, the UK courts have applied the principle of abatement in the context of tenanted properties.

The rent abatement was to be offset against the Defendant's claim for rent arrears.

👷‍♂️ The court rejected the claim that the Claimant had been deprived of quiet enjoyment of the premises by the ‘noisy’ repair work. This was for lack of evidence. The Court also rejected the claim for loss of manhours, in part due to a lack of evidence and also in part because dealing with operational issues (such as office defects) is to be expected of any company.

🔥 The court disallowed the Defendant’s claim vis-à-vis the fire insurance. The clause relied on obliged the Claimant to buy fire insurance “in the names of the landlord”. The objective of the insuring clause was to ensure that the building was adequately insured. Obtaining insurance in the join names of landlord and tenant did not breach the obligation. Further, even if the Claimant’s actions amounted to a breach of the clause no losses were alleged to have flowed from such breach.

SG High Court clarifies what is meant by 'gross negligence' - Stamford Land Corp Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2026] SGHC 202

The Claimants engaged the Defendant to manage a Rights Issue. The issuance went wrong resulting in a potential breach of r 877(10) of the Mainboard Rules under the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited Listing Manual. SGX investigated and instituted proceedings. The Claimants engaged lawyers to defend themselves and later settled the claim. The Claimants sought to recover their losses from the Defendant.

The Defendant sought to rely on an exclusion clause in their Letter of Engagement. The exclusion clause protected the Defendant against were negligence but not against "willful default or gross negligence".

Gross negligence is a commonly encountered term, but one which is hard to define. As noted by Dedar Singh Gill J at [117] of the judgment, it has been observed that the term “gross negligence” is not susceptible of a precise definition or standard as it is a heavily fact-sensitive inquiry. However, His Honour needed to pin down the definition in order to decide the case.

His Honour made the following observations:

[118] It stands to reason that “gross” negligence represents something more fundamental than a mere failure to exercise proper skill and/or care constituting negligence.

[119] The concept of gross negligence also encompasses a “serious disregard of or indifference to an obvious risk” and not only conduct undertaken with an actual appreciation of the risks involved

[120] to [123] in one of the few local precedent cases, Creative Technology v Huawei International Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 201, Huawei had serious disregard and indifference to the “obvious high risks” when carrying out its work and was thus grossly negligent.

On the facts of the case, UOB was grossly negligent as features of its conduct elevated its failure to exercise proper skill and care to that of gross negligence. It failed to conduct expected checks, it had no clear internal interpretation of the listing rules, it had never faced a situation where non-restricted induvial undersubscribed but restricted individuals oversubscribed and it admitted that it had limited experience conducting rights issuances generally. Finally, no thought was given to the precise consequences should the Rights Issuance be non-compliant