Singapore Insurance Law Round-up (January – April 2026)
A round up of our social media posts showing important developments in insurance law in Singapore between January and April 2026
Happy New Year! IMDG Code Amendment 42-24 becomes mandatory today.
There are more than 300 updates, including new sections and revisions to existing rules. Key updates include:
⚓ 60+ revisions to the Dangerous Goods List (DGL)
several changes to UN 1361 (carbon) and UN1362 (activated carbon)
11 new UN Numbers to cover emerging hazardous materials such as UN 3552 (sodium-ion batteries) and UN 3556-3558 (new energy vehicles)
⚓ 50+ updates to packing instructions
e.g. P912 (battery-powered vehicles)
⚓ Changes to shipping and documentation requirements
e.g. expanded battery labels and enhanced docs for carbon products
⚓ changes to transport, handling and stowage
e.g. carbon is now included in class 4 stowage
Global shippers have already been voluntarily applying the amendments over the past year. But Insurers should note that the amendments are now mandatory.
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (Dangerous Goods, Petroleum and Explosives) (Amendment No. 2) Regulations 2025 and came into operation on 1 January 2026
The amendment updates the list of dangerous goods in the first schedule of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (Dangerous Goods, Petroleum and Explosives) Regulations 2005.
New year, new insurance law case!!!! Gurpreet Gill Maag v Chubb Insurance Singapore Limited [2026] SGDC 6
The case arose against the backdrop of Gurpreet Gill Maag & 3 Ors v Ian McKee [2025] SGHC 221 which was a claim brought by Mdm Maag, her husband and two companies which Mdm Maag was a 100% shareholder and director. The claim was brought against Mr McKee for various causes of action, including, inducement of breach of contract, breach of confidentiality, malicious falsehood, slander and libel. Mr McKee counterclaimed against Mdm Maag for defamation.
Mdm Maag had a Chubb homeowners’ policy which provided personal liability cover for her and her family.
Mdm Maag asked the District Court to for (1) a declaration that Chubb is obliged to pay for the defence costs in the counterclaim, (2) a declaration that no policy exclusions apply and (3) an order for parties to agree on the costs of defending the counter claim.
District Judge Chiah Kok Khun declined to give the declarations, holding:
👨⚖️ Chubb would only be liable for the costs of defending Mdm Maag against a lawsuit IF the liability for that lawsuit was covered under the Policy. This is because the duty to defend is NOT separate from the duty to indemnify, but is restricted to claims which fall within the scope of the policy.
👨⚖️ Determining coverage entails the examination of any applicable exclusion clauses in order to establish if coverage for damages has not been excluded.
👨⚖️ On the facts, the policy contained exclusions for ‘business pursuits’ and ‘directors liability’. These exclusions came into play -on the facts because the counterclaim by Mr McKee arose out of events which happened in a business meeting.
The decision was reached based on overseas case law as the there was a ‘dearth of local case authorities’.
Does making an offer to a policyholder amount to an admission of policy liability? - A further lesson from Gurpreet Gill Maag v Chubb Insurance Singapore Limited [2026] SGDC 6.
To recap, the policyholder was arguing that the homeowner policy provided an indemnity for legal costs incurred in defending a counterclaim. The insurer was of the view that there was no indemnity because of the nature of the counterclaim.
The policyholder also argued that the insurer had admitted liability under the policy by (1) extending a settlement offer to the policyholder in an email which was not marked 'without prejudice' and also in recommending that the policyholder continue to use her existing counsel to defend the counterclaim.
The District Court held that on the facts there had been no waiver.
👨⚖️ The absence of the words "without prejudice" was not conclusive. The court will look at all the circumstances of the offer. In this case the offer was made during the course of negotiations to settle a dispute and contained an explanation of why the offer was being made. The offer was therefore made on a WP basis.
👨⚖️ There was also no admission in recommending that the policyholder continue to use her counsel. The thrust of the email in which the recommendation was made was that the insurer was still assessing policy coverage and would inform the policyholder in due course. The email then stated that since the policyholder had already engaged a lawyer she should continue to use this lawyer.
Can an appellate court allow further arguments from the parties after it has already rendered its decision on an application? If so, on what basis should further arguments be allowed? Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2025] SGHC(A) 26
The Applicant was a lawyer who had won a defamation case against a former client. The judge awarded damages on 28 March 2025, dealt with costs on 2 July 2025 and fixed disbursements on 8 August 2025.
The Applicant filed a notice of appeal on 18 August 2025. The filing was rejected on the basis that the appeal was out of time. On 20 August 2025 the Applicant filed an application for, among other things, an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against the three decisions (28 March, 2 July, 8 August). The filing was rejected as the application was made to the incorrect court. Finally, on 1 September 2025, the application was filed as HC/OA 32/2025.
On 13 October 2025, the Appellate Division of the High Court dismissed HC/OA 32/2025. Two weeks later, the Applicant filed a request to make further arguments in respect of HC/OA 32/2025.
The intended further arguments included arguments addressing the reasons used by the court to dismiss HC/OA 32/2025.
The Court held that whilst the Rules of Court do not contain any rules governing further arguments after an appeal hearing, an appellate court is not precluded from considering requests. Order 3 r 2(2) of the ROC 2021 empowers the court to do what is necessary on the facts of the case before it to ensure that justice is done or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court, so long as it is not prohibited by law, and further arguments are consistent with the Five Ideals as they could affect fair access to justice. Furthermore, the court is not always immediately functus officio after it has given its judgment as there are circumstances where a court may either revisit its prior decision or clarify it.
For further arguments after a decision has been made, the same broad principles found in O18 and O19 (i.e. the finality of the court process and the interests of justice) apply. The threshold to get permission is high as further arguments are not intended to allow a party “a second bite at the cherry if they felt that their submissions had not been well received at the hearing of the appeal”.
On the facts, the application was dismissed. The arguments raised were an attempt to cure the defects in earlier submissions. There were no exceptional circumstances or good reasons for the court to reconsider its decision.
ROC 2021 does not make it mandatory for a Defendant to include any counter claim in the same action - Sree Ram Construction Pte Ltd v Green Tag Scaffolding Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGHCR 39
Order 6 Rule 8(1) of ROC 2021 says that “If the defendant intends to counterclaim against the claimant, the defendant must file and serve the counterclaim with the defence.”
The equivalent in the old rules (i.e. Order 6 rule 8(1) ROC 2024) provided that “... a defendant in any action who alleges that he has any claim or is entitled to any relief or remedy against a plaintiff in the action in respect of any matter (whenever and however arising) may, instead of bringing a separate action, make a counterclaim in respect of that matter; and where he does so he must add the counterclaim to his defence". Case law had made it clear that this provision meant that a defendant had the option – but not the obligation – to counterclaim.
In Sree Ram Construction Pte Ltd v Green Tag Scaffolding Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGHCR 39, AR Vikram Rajaram held that despite the change in wording, the position under the ROC 2021 remains materially the same as that under ROC 2014.
The reason - Order 6 r 8(1) starts with the word “if”. This makes it an enabling provision in the way that the older rule 2(1) was. The word “if” in the new provision acts in the same way as the word “may” in the old provision. Support was also drawn from the Civil Justice Commission Report (which did not state that the drafters intended to change the established position under the ROC 2014) and from the Academy Publishing Rules of Court textbook.
A cautionary tale for brokers changing firms - Guy Carpenter & Co Pte Ltd v Choi Okmi and others [2025] SGHC 241.
The 1st and 2nd Defendants had worked for the Claimant in Singapore. They later moved to work for a rival Korean-based broker (the 3rd Defendant) and its Singapore-based subsidiary (4th Defendant).
The case centred on whether two employees (the 1st and 2nd Defendants), while still in the service of the Claimant and before their official dates of departure, had begun to act in concert with the 3rd and 4th Defendant to divert business from the Claimant to the 4th Defendant. If there had been a conspiracy, had the 1st and 2nd Defendants breached their employment contracts? What were the liabilities of the 3rd and 4th Defendants?
Following a trial on liability the court held:
All four defendants were liable for the tort of unlawful means conspiracy
The 1st and 2nd Defendants were liable for the breaches of their duties of good faith, breaches of contractual terms prohibiting secondary employment, and breaches of the Non-solicitation and Non-dealing Covenants. The duties of good faith which had been breached were both express (they were in the code of conduct) and implied.
The 1st Defendant was liable for breaching her equitable confidentiality obligations by forwarded certain emails to her personal email address. The Court accepted that information in the emails had been provided by the Claimant to markets for brokering purposes was confidential and was received in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. The court did not accept that the 1st Defendant had sent the emails with a clear conscious, for the claimant’s benefit.
The 1st Defendant was liable for breaches of the Claimant’s compliance policies which she had agreed to follow. The breaches centred on the 1st Defendant sending the Claimant’s company information to her personal email account for review on her personal devices.
The 1st Defendant was liable for inducing the 2nd Defendant to breach the contractual term prohibiting secondary employment and the Non-solicitation and Non-dealing Covenants in the employment contract.
The court rejected the Defendant’s argument that there should be no liability as clients are free to decide where to take their business. The Court held that whilst true, it misses the point. Instead, “for the system to function coherently, and for wider commercial relationships to be sustained with any degree of integrity, it is essential that employees are duty-bound to act in good faith to advance the interests of their current employers, rather than (as was the case here) quietly facilitating client migration in anticipation of profiting from future roles elsewhere… Put another way, the right of the client to walk away does not absolve the employee of their duty to stand firm in their obligations, for these are not mutually exclusive.”
Worker fails to show that his workplace accident was the fault of his employer – Uddin Mohammad Zosim v CES Engineering & Construction Pte. Ltd. [2025] SGDC 331.
In this industrial accident case the court accepted that the Claimant was injured when he was bending a re-bar using a customized rebar bender (when he was carrying out the work, the rebar broke off and he fell on his back). But the court was not persuaded that that the Claimant had shown that this was the Defendant’s fault. He also failed to show that the system of work was unsafe. The court attached significance to him having 7 years of experience in bending rebars using a rebar bender - he was familiar with the process of doing so and did not require supervision as the job could be done by one person. The Claimant did not adduce any evidence that the industry standard was to build a platform and deploy two workers to use an electric rebar bending machine for the Claimant’s task.
🚢⚖️ Sanctions & Marine Insurance: A Reality Check
Against the events around the Straits of Hormuz, the UK has just sanctioned NZ-based insurer Maritime Mutual over alleged links to Russian & Iranian oil shipments.
🌍 This highlights how quickly insurers can be pulled into geopolitical crossfire—and why compliance is no longer optional.
🔎 Sanctions risk isn't abstract. It affects underwriting, liability, and reputation in real time.
A.I. hallucinations back in the news.
Last year we reported that a Singapore Judge had invited two lawyers to explain how fictious authorities came to be cited in their closing submissions.
In Tan Hai Peng Micheal and another v Tan Cheong Joo and another and other matters [2026] SGHC 49 the Judge has levied personal cost orders of $5,000 against the two counsel responsible for the submissions on the basis that:
"The citation of fictitious authorities strikes at the heart of the adversarial system and when cited by a solicitor, constitutes a fundamental failing in the duty owed to the court by an officer of that court. Further, the Claimants have suffered prejudice, having been compelled to respond to fictitious authorities advanced in support of a central argument on the burden of proof – there should be monetary recompense to right that prejudice caused by the solicitors responsible for advancing the Defendants’ case."
New Guide for Using Generative AI in the Singapore Legal Sector
On 6 March Singapore Ministry of Law published its Guide for Using Generative AI in the Legal Sector.
The guide is structured around three principles- professional ethics, confidentiality and transparency.
The guide sets out a five-step implementation framework for law practices and legal teams to guide them in deploying AI work tools. The framework includes developing an AI governance policy, assessing workflow needs, evaluating tools and providing training to users.
The scope of the insurance exception to double recovery - NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Limited v Noel Martin Carlin [2026] SGHC 48
🤕 When the “insurance exception” applies a claimant is entitled to retain the benefit of a payouts from the insurance policy and also claim damages from the tortfeasor.
➡️ The Court of Appeal in Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng [2024] 1 SLR 964 laid out a four pronged test for assessing whether the insurance exception applied. The test was focused on establishing the purpose of the third-party payment and looked at
(1) whether the plaintiff contributed to the relevant payment
(2) whether the payment is in the nature of an indemnity for or is targeted directly at the type of loss for which damages were sought
(3) the source of the payment
(4) whether the payment was made available to a wide group of persons or was directed to the Claimant’s individual circumstances
➡️ In NTUC v Noel Martin Carlin the High Court considered an appeal concerning the first ‘Eng Beng’ factor. The Claimant alleged that although his employer had purchased the insurance policy, he had effectively contributed to the purchase by accepting a lower base salary with the knowledge that the employer would pay for medical and life insurance. The High Court judge accepted the Claimant’s evidence and held that there no double recovery.