Lessors for Lawyers – appeal timelines, extensions of time and the Rules of Court 2021
credit: unsplash.com
A lawyer’s duty
In Singapore, the legal profession is ‘fused’ which means that a lawyer admitted to the Singapore Bar can be both a solicitor and an advocate. Recent amendments to the Legal Profession Act also allow persons to qualify as non-practising lawyers. For the purpose of this article, we use the term ‘lawyer’ to cover practising advocates and solicitors and the article is restricted to looking at the duties of such lawyers.
It is trite that a lawyer owes his client a duty of care and that there may be concurrent duties in tort and in contract. As to the standard of care, a lawyer is expected to exercise the care and skill of a “reasonably competent solicitor” in discharging his duties (see Su Ah Tee and others v Allister Lim and Thrumugan (sued as a firm) and another (William Cheng and others, third parties) [2014] SGHC 159 at [70]).
In the context of whether a lawyer had failed to properly advise on appeal timelines, Justice Belinda Ang Saw Ean (as she then was) made the following observations about a lawyer’s duty of care in Chew Kim Kee v Kertar and Co [2004] SGHC 95:
14 It is common ground that one of the obligations of an advocate and solicitor in carrying out his retainer is to exercise the care and skill of a competent practitioner in the discharge of his duties: Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch 384 at 403. The Court of Appeal in Chong Yeo & Partners v Guan Ming Hardware & Engineering Pte Ltd [1997] 2 SLR 729 iterated the principle with reference to the advocate and solicitor’s obligation to observe the Rules of Court (at [63]):
For a breach of that duty of care to have occurred, the appellants must have, on the balance of probabilities, omitted to do a thing which a reasonably competent advocate and solicitor in their position would have done: Godefroy v Dalton [(1830) 6 Bing 460; 130 ER 1357]. Such a reasonably competent advocate and solicitor must comply with all rules of court to protect his client’s interests.
15 The precise content of the duty of reasonable skill and care will depend on the circumstances of each case. There can be no doubt that an advocate and solicitor will be in breach of duty if he does not carry out, in a timely manner, his client’s instructions to appeal. He is also under a duty to warn the client of the deadline for appealing and about the effect of a failure to file a timely notice of appeal. These duties are predicated on there being in existence a solicitor and client relationship stemming from the advocate and solicitor’s retainer or, alternatively and independent of the contract, a relationship of proximity brought about by the retainer sufficient to found a duty of care in negligence. In this case, the duties of care in contract and in tort are not only concurrent, they are co-extensive and hence overlap, so much so that a finding that the retainer had terminated will simultaneously resolve the duty of care question in contract and in tort.
Chew Kim Kee concerned the issue of whether a lawyer owed a client a duty to advise on the deadline for appeal after the lawyer-client relationship had ceased. Her Honour accepted the lawyer’s evidence that he informed his client on the day that the relationship ended that she had 14 days to appeal against the decision. Her Honour then went on to hold that in any case she was no persuaded that there was a causal link between the alleged breach of duty and the alleged loss. This was because the plaintiff had not appointed replacement solicitors with due expedience and had made a decision not to attempt an appeal.
Professional Indemnity Insurance
The Legal Profession (Professional Indemnity Insurance) Rules require every lawyer who intends to apply for a practising certificate to maintain insurance cover at all times during the period that he/she will be carrying on the business of providing legal services. The minimum amount of insurance cover is specified in the Schedule to the Rules.
Professional indemnity insurance is designed to protect professionals against a wide range of potential liabilities which may flow from a breach of their professional duty. Depending on policy wording, failing to advise on the merits of an appeal or failing to file appeal papers on time are likely to fall within the scope of cover. Actual coverage will of course depend on other important factors such as whether the professional has complied with the terms and conditions of the policy.
The Law Society’s Compulsory Professional Indemnity Insurance was introduced in April 1991 to ensure every practising lawyer has minimum insurance coverage. The minimum amount of cover is set by the Council of the Law Society and is reviewed from time to time. Law firms can buy additional cover.
Post April 2022 Case Law
The Rules of Court (“ROC”) 2021 came into operation on 1 April 2022, replacing the previous 2014 rules.
The ROC 2021 together with the accompanying Practice Directions and amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (“SCJA”) overhauled the litigation process and made certain important changes to how and when appeals should be brought. The changes to the appeals process are mainly found in Orders 18, 19 and 20 of the ROC 2021. The changes were summarised in a digest provided by the Supreme Court ahead of their launch.
Since the ROC 2021 came into force, there have been a number of cases interpreting Orders 18, 19 and 20. We look at some of these cases in the section below. It is apparent from our review that many of the pre-ROC 2021 precedents remain good law despite the changes to the appeal regime.
Whether the intended appeal falls under Order 18, Order 19 or Order 20
Orders 18 to 20 cover different scenarios: Order 18 governs appeals from applications in actions, Order 19 governs appeals from judgments and orders after trial and Order 20 applies to appeals from tribunals and case stated.
Lawyers should take note that the appeal timelines vary between Orders 18 to 20. Good practice is to check and double check which Order applies.
In Koh Lin Yee v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd [2025] SGHC 74 the application was for an extension of time to appeal against the decision of a judge in a High Court Registrars Appeal, but a preliminary issue as to whether the appeal should be governed by Order 18 or Order 19. If Order 18 applied the application was filed out of time, whereas if Order 19 applied then the appeal had been made timeously.
The Defendant, OCBC, had served a statutory demand on the Claimant and then, since full payment was not forthcoming, commenced bankruptcy proceedings. At the hearing of the bankruptcy application the Claimant expressed his intention to set aside the statutory demand. The Claimant duly filed his application but the same was dismissed by an Assistant Registrar on 28 November 2024. On 12 December 2024 the Claimant appealed. The appeal was heard and dismissed by a Judge on 17 February 2025.
On 17 March 2025 the Claimant filed a summons for extension of time to appeal. The respondent argued that the summons was out of time under Order 18. However, the Judge concluded that Order 19 applied, not Order 18. This was because the meaning of “judgment” and “trial” in Order 19 rule 3 caught hearings on the merits of an originating claim or an originating application and bot the Assistant Registrar’s decision of 28 November and the dismissal of the appeal on 17 February were decisions on the merits.
Although the summons was filed in time, the judge went on to dismiss the application. The reason for this dismissal is explored later in this article.
Is referring to the wrong version of the Rules of Court a ground for an extension of time to file an appeal?
In Newspaper Seng Logistics Pte Ltd v Chiap Seng Productions Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 5, the applicant, Newspaper Seng Logistics, sought an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal out of time against the decision of the General Division of the High Court.
The need for an extension of time arose because the appellant’s lawyer was unfamiliar with ROC 2021. The lawyer had assumed that the appeal against the decision of the Judge would be governed by the 2014 rules and not the 2021 rules. As such she thought she had 1 month to file the appeal rather than 28 days. Therefore, her filing on day 29 was out of time.
Before the Appellate Division the lawyer argued that an extension should be given because she had made a genuine mistake on the timeline and the application was only one day late.
In its decision, the Appellate Division noted that the court’s power to grant permission under Order 19 rule 25 of the ROC 2021 is discretionary and that the exercise of discretion is governed by the overriding objective of finality in litigation and by the general principles underlying the appeal regime.
On the merits of the application. The Appellate Division noted that changes to the Rules of Court had been well publicised and that a transitional phase had been provided to lawyers. The present appeal, however, fell outside the transitional phase, and in the words of the court, “it is difficult to find that there was a real difficulty or complexity in the application of the procedural rules”. The Court went on to stress that “timelines in court orders and procedural rules must be complied with.”
However, after considering the relevant factors, the court exercised its discretion to allow the filling and service of the notice of appeal out of time. The court placed emphasis on the delay being very short and there was urgency exercised by the applicant in seeking to rectify the mistake. Further, the appeal papers had been received by opposing counsel on day 29 which was only one day late.
Although the application was successful the court awarded costs in favour of the respondent. This was because the need for the extension had arisen from the applicant’s default.
The Author doubts whether the court would allow an appeal on similar grounds any more given that the ROC 2021 has now been in operation for over three years.
When does the clock start to run under Order 19?
In its original form, Order 19 rule 4 provided that the time for filing an appeal / applying for permission to appeal “does not start to run until after the lower Court has heard and determined all matters in the trial, including cost”. However, with effect from 1 February 2024, the following additional sub-rule was added into rule 4:
(1A) Where the lower Court does not hear and determine the issue of costs within 30 days after the lower Court has heard and determined all other matters in the trial, the time for the filing of an appeal or for the filing of an application for permission to appeal starts to run after the expiry of the 30‑day period, even if the lower Court has directed that submissions on costs be made.
Rule 4 is a potential stumbling block as the question of whether the court has “determined all matters in the trial” and whether the 30 day rule applies is not always straight forward. This can be seen from Shipworks Engineering Pte Ltd and another v Sembcorp Marine Integrated Yard Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2025] SGHC(A) 19. The Claimants in that case were contracted to perform works for the Defendant and were claiming for unpaid invoices and on quantum meruit for works done. The Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that the Claimants could not have performed all the works claimed for and that the Claimants were overcharging. The dispute went for trial in late 2024.
On 20 December 2024 the judge partially allowed both claims and ordered parties to jointly compute the quantum. As parties could not resolve the quantum they returned for a quantum judgment. However, when giving his quantum judgment on 13 March 2025, the judge noted that there was a discrepancy between parties’ position on the number of payment hours and the rate charged for 13 of the work orders that formed part of the Defendants’ counterclaim. The judge directed that parties reach an agreement on this sum.
Following the 13 March 2025 judgment, the Defendants wrote to court to seek pre-judgment interest and the court partially allowed their request on 2 April 2025. Thereafter, parties resolved the remaining issue of quantum on 5 May 2025 and proceeded for a costs hearing on 21 May.
On 29 May 2025, the Claimant filed a single Notice of Appeal against the liability judgment, quantum judgment and the costs award.
On 4 June 2025, the Claimant’s solicitors told the Defendant’s solicitors that they were out of time for their appeal. The Defendant’s solicitors hastily filed two Notices of Appeal (one against the liability judgment and one against the quantum judgment) and thereafter filed an application for extension of time (EOT) for their appeals.
Both parties filed applications to strike out the others’ appeal. Of interest is that the Defendant argued that the Claimant’s appeal should be struck out because only one NOA was filed.
The Appellate Division heard the striking out and EOT applications. The Court noted that Order 19 rule 25(1)(a) sets a 28 day window for an appeal to be filed, but rule 25 needs to be read with rule 4(1) which states that unless the court otherwise orders, the time for the filing of an appeal does not start to run until after the lower court has heard and determined all matters in the trial, including costs. However, this position is subject to rule 4(1A) which states that where the lower court does not hear and determine the issue of costs within 30 days after the lower court has determined all other matters in the trial, time for the filing of an appeal starts to run after the expiry of the 30-day period.
On the facts, the 13 March Judgment did not determine all the matters in the trial save for costs. It was only on 5 May 2025 that the judge was able to decide on all matters save for costs. As the decision of costs on 21 May was within the 30 day period, the time to appeal started on 22 May 2025 and expired 28 days later on 18 June 2025. The Claimant’s Notice of Appeal was therefore in time. Accordingly there was no need for the court to decide on whether to grant an EOT for the filing. However, the court said obiter that it would have been a suitable matter to allow an EOT as the dispute on timelines arose from unusual circumstances and there had been no undue prejudice to the Claimant in allowing an EOT.
The Appellate Division then held that the Claimant was correct in filing only one Notice of Appeal as the dispute was not bifurcated. Although the Defendant had erroneously filed two Notices of Appeal, the Claimant had not sought to strike out the notices on the grounds that they were erroneously drafted. As such, the court allowed the Defendant to withdraw one Notice of Appeal and continue on an amended solo notice.
It is submitted that good practice is for the court to provide counsel with guidance when issues are left open in an appeal. A good example of judicial guidance being given can be seen in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 561 v Kosma Holdings Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC 185 where Justice Philip Jeyaretnam stated in the conclusion of his decision that “for the avoidance of doubt and in line with O 19 r 4 of the Rules of Court 2021, the time for an appeal will only run from the date on which any order to create an easement is made, together with the ancillary and consequential orders, including costs.”
Applying the four factors in Lee Hsien Loong in applications for extension of time to file an appeal
In Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party and others and another suit [2008] 1 SLR(R) 757 the Court of Appeal set out four factors that courts should consider when considering whether to allow an extension of time to appeal. The four factors were (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the applicant’s chances of success; and (d) any prejudice that the respondent would suffer if the extension of time is granted. As will be seen below, Lee Hsein Loon remains good law notwithstanding the changes in the Rules of Court.
Tan Heng Khoon (trading as 360 VR Cars) v Wang Shing He [2024] SGHC 243 concerned an appeal against a Deputy Registrar’s decision requiring the Defendant to provide security for costs. A Notice of Appeal was filed on time but was rejected by the Registry for incorrectly stating which decision was being appealed. Therefore, the Defendant sought an extension of time for the filing.
The court upheld the use of the four Lee Hsein Loong factors and then opined that the court’s inquiry tends to be on the first two factors (i.e. length of the delay and reasons for the delay) because of the nature of the other two factors. The court explained that the third factor (ie, chances of success in the would-be appeal) is set at a low threshold to sieve out clearly hopeless appeals, and therefore the court does not scrutinise too closely the merits of the would-be appeal. The fourth factor (ie, prejudice to the would-be respondent) is ever present, but the court should only look at prejudice occasioned to the respondent over and above the mere fact that the notice of appeal may be lodged out of time where otherwise the appeal would not proceed at all.
On the facts, the Court was of the view that the delay in filing the appeal was not a lengthy one. Further, an honest mistake had been made in the original appeal papers which was corrected in haste as soon as the registry pointed it out. As such an extension of time was granted. With regards to the respondent’s argument that the appellant had courted danger by filing the papers on the last possible day, the court held that it was unfair to deduct the time it took the registry to spot a mistake from the time available to a party to file an appeal. The fact that a Notice to Appeal was filed on the last possible day should not be taken as showing that a party have consciously forfeited the opportunity to file a corrected Notice of Appeal on time.
Good practice and risk management would of course be to file the Notice of Appeal in good time in order to have time to re-file if necessary. However, there may be strategic reasons to hold back the filing and instructions may only come in at the last minute.
In LLS Capital Pte Ltd v Chan Swee Lean and another [2025] SGHC 194 the court reiterated that focus of the inquiry tends to be on (a) the length of the delay and (b) the reasons for the delay. The Defendants in that case were arguing that an Originating Application (OA) should be converted into an Originating Claim, or alternatively that an extension of time be granted to them to appeal against the decision in the OA. The Court was not with the Defendant on either argument. Regarding the extension of time, the court noted that there was a five-month delay between the decision being reached in the OA and the application for extension of time and no good reason was given for this. As to the merits of the appeal, the argument that the loan agreement (the document being fought over in the OA) was illegal had not been raised below and to allow it to be raised now was an abuse of process. Finally, the court noted that there were “rampant procedural irregularities” in the summons and this “buttressed” the court’s decision not to allow an extension of time.
In Koh Lin Yee v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd [2025] SGHC 74 the application was for an extension of time to appeal against an earlier Registrar’s Appeal. Again, the decision centred on the length and reason of the delay. The Judge was of the view that there was an excessive delay as the application for permission to appeal was filed on the last day of the 28 period and did not state the length of the extension sought. In oral submissions the lawyer suggested a 4 to 7 month extension may be needed but offered no satisfactory reason why. The Judge also expressed the view that the intended appeal was hopeless
In Lew Huey Jiun Isabelle and another v Lee Yu Ru Michael and another [2025] SGHC 1 the High Court confirmed that the four factors are also relevant to appeals governed by Order 20. In this case, the appellant filed an application for an extension of time on the last day of appeal. However, the appellant did not file a Notice of Appeal. The court was not persuaded by the Claimant’s explanation as to why the appeal was not filed. The court then went on to express the view that the intended appeal would be hopeless.
The Lee Hsien Loong factors and seeking an extension of time to file for permission to appeal
In Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee and another [2024] SGHC(A) 3, the Appellate Division noted that while the four factor test for an application for extension of time were well-settled, the relevant considerations for the third factor (ie, the prospect of success) merited some clarification in the context of an application for extension of time to file an application for permission to appeal.
The court in Pradeepto held that the correct approach in an application for extension of time to file an application for permission to appeal “is to first consider whether the application for permission to appeal could be said to be hopeless, before considering whether the substantive appeal will be hopeless”. The Court opened that “if the court finds that an applicant is unlikely to succeed in obtaining permission to appeal, then granting an extension of time to file an application for permission to appeal would be futile and a waste of resources for all concerned.”
On the facts, Mr Pradeepto needed an extension of time because of filing errors made by his lawyers when applying for permission to appeal. The court was of the view that the intended permission to appeal application was hopeless as was the intended appeal. The Court noted that Mr Pradeepto had not specified what the prima facie error of law made by the Judge was and the Court saw no reason to disagree with the Judge’s findings on the admissibility of evidence.
The Lee Hsien Loong factors and seeking an extension of time for filing appeal submissions
Sunpower Semiconductor Ltd v Powercom Yuraku Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 14 was an application for an extension of time to file written submissions for an Appeal. Sunpower had filed an appeal to the Appellate Division of the High Court on 13 September and on 16 September 2022, the court issued a notice pursuant to O 18 r 33(5)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021. This mean that parties were required to file written submissions for the Appeal by 30 September 2022. However, Sunpower changed solicitors during this period and on 21 September its new solicitors request and extension of time to 7 December 2022 to file their submissions. The registry allowed the request, but on 26 October 2022 Sunpower’s new solicitors applied to discharge themselves. Sunpower the appointed a third set of lawyers on 2 December. The third set of solicitors wrote to seek an extension of time on 7 December.
In the meantime, the respondent filed its written submissions on 7 December 2022, but Sunpower did not. Pursuant to Order 18 rule 33(12) of the Rules of Court 2021, the Appeal was deemed withdrawn unless the appellate court otherwise orders.
The Appellate Division applied the four factors in Lee Hsien Loong but stressed that they were non-exhaustive and factors such as achieving finality must also be considered. The Court was critical of Sunpower’s reason for the delay, which was said to have arisen because the sole director of the business was having to nurse his mother at the time and his mother then passed away. The Court held that the real cause of the delay was not the mother’s ill health and death but because the director had failed to provide funds to the second lawyer which resulted in the lawyer discharging his/her self, thus necessitating the director having to find a replacement lawyer at the last minute. The Court expressed the view that there was therefore no good reason for the delay. The delay was also not “insignificant”.
The court went on to consider the merits of the intended appeal. The court noted that Sunpower’s main argument revolved around the interpretation of an e-mail. However, the Appellate Division held that Sunpower’s arguments were essentially an attempt to avoid the clear wording of the email and that the appellant’s case was meritless.
The court thus dismissed the application, declined to allow the appeal to continue and ordered Sunpower to pay $8,000 costs.
The test to be satisfied for permission to appeal is that in Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862
In Mazzagatti, Francesco v Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2025] SGCA 46, Mr Francesco applied for permission to appeal against a decision of a judge of the General Division of the High Court. A two-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed his application.
Mr Francesco had been a director of the respondent company and the company had sought pre-action production of documents. Dissatisfied with the production given, the respondent applied to commenced committal proceedings. Before the hearing of the application, the respondent applied for permission to file a further affidavit and obtained permission to do so. Mr Francesco then filed OA14 in which he submitted that the Judge made a prima facie case of error in holding that the court has the power to permit an additional affidavit containing further evidence to be filed for committal applications. He also alleged that the Judge erred in ruling that the Ladd v Marshall test did not apply to determine whether to grant the request to file a further affidavit.
The High Court confirmed that the test which the applicant had to satisfy to get permission to appeal was that set out in Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 at [16]. In other words, the applicant had to show at least one of the following grounds (a) there is a prima facie case of error; (b) there is a question of general principle to be decided for the first time; and (c) there is a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage. The court then opined that an overarching consideration of the three grounds is that a denial of permission would result in a miscarriage of justice and that permission should not be granted if the outcome of the case will remain unchanged.
The Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed Mr Francesco’s application. The Court of Appeal affirmed that the court had the power to allow further affidavit to be filed. The court noted that Order 3 rule 5(7) of the ROC 2021 provides that an affidavit in support of or in opposition to an application must contain all necessary evidence and may contain statements of information or belief with their sources and grounds clearly stated. The court also observed that there may be additional requirements depending on the type of application (for example proving names and addresses need to be provided if the application is for committal proceedings). The court noted that the court’s general powers as listed in Order 3 rule 2 did not prohibit further affidavits in support of existing grounds.
The Court of Appeal then set out the following non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered by a court in the exercising its discretion to allow a further affidavit to be filed:
(a) an explanation as to why information or evidence in the further affidavit could not have been included in the first affidavit;
(b) whether the information or evidence in the further affidavit bears some relevance to the application;
(c) whether the request to file a further affidavit was made promptly; and
(d) whether there is undue procedural prejudice to the other party if the request is granted.
The Court of Appeal observed that the Ladd v Marshall test is not applicable as the main committal hearing (SUM 195) had not yet been heard on its merits.
The Courts power to stay an appeal for non- payment of costs
In Huttons Asia Pte Ltd and another v Chen Qiming [2024] SGHC(A) 33 the court considered an application under Order 21 rule 2(6) ROC 2021 to stay an appeal on the grounds that costs in the underlying suit had to been paid.
Order 21 rule 2(6) is a new provision and sets out the court’s express power to stay an appeal pending payment of the costs below. This express new power obviates the need to rely on the court’s inherent powers, which could only be called on to prevent injustice or abuse of process. Accordingly, less weight should be accorded to older case law which had held that the court should only intervene if there were “special or exceptional circumstances”.
The Court allowed the application as the facts suggested that Mr Chen was evading payment and his filing of an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution by virtue of Section 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. Further, although Mr Chen asserted that his finances had not been stable, he had not tendered evidence to substantiate this. The Appellate Division held that “allowing Mr Chen to proceed with AD 40 would be inconsistent with the Ideals set out in O 3 r 1(2) of the ROC 2021 and would subvert the goal of achieving fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties”
The five ideals
The Five Ideals are new to the ROC 2021. Order 3 Rule 1 (2) and (3) requires the court to seek to achieve the following Ideals in all of its orders and directions:
(a) fair access to justice;
(b) expeditious proceedings;
(c) cost‑effective work proportionate to —
(i) the nature and importance of the action;
(ii) the complexity of the claim as well as the difficulty or novelty of the issues and questions it raises; and
(iii) the amount or value of the claim;
(d) efficient use of court resources;
(e) fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties.
Further, the court has broad general powers under Order 3 rule 2(2) of the ROC 2021, which states that:
“Where there is no express provision in these Rules or any other written law on any matter, the Court may do whatever the Court considers necessary on the facts of the case before it to ensure that justice is done or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court, so long as it is not prohibited by law and is consistent with the Ideals.”
So far there have only been a handful of cases in which the courts have considered how the Five Ideals apply to appeals. The court in Mazzagatti held that it would be consistent with the Ideal of ensuring fair access to justice set out in Order 3 rule 1(2)(a) ROC 2021, to allow a party to file a further affidavit. And in Huttons Asia Pte Ltd and another v Chen Qiming [2024] SGHC(A) 33 the court stayed an appeal noting that allowing the appellant to proceed with his appeal would be inconsistent with the Ideals set out in Order 3 rule 1(2) ROC 2021 and would “subvert the goal of achieving fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties”.
As the court must seek to achieve the five ideals in all its orders and directions Practitioners should remember to include mention of the ideals in their affidavits and submissions for applications.
Continued application of the Ladd v Marshall test
The Ladd v Marshall test continues to apply to applications to adduce further evidence on appeal (see for example Lew Huey Jiun Isabelle and another Lee Yu Ru Michael and another [2025] SGHC 1 and Vietnam Oil and Gas Group v Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) [2025] SGCA 12). However, it has been recently restated for other applications the test may not apply. For example, the court in Mazzagatti held that the test was not engaged when seeking permission to file a further affidavit. In Darsan Jitendra Jhaveri and others v Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar (suing as the administratrix of the estate of Anil Vassudeva Salgaocar) and another [2024] SGHC(A) 20 the further evidence was to be used only in relation to an argument that the court should not hear an appeal because of the Hadkinson principle (i.e. that the court should not hear a party in contempt unless and until he ha s purged his contempt). Since, generally speaking, no leave is required to rely on documents for the purpose of persuading the court not to hear an appeal, the Ladd v Marshall test did not apply. In WRX v WRY and another matter [2024] SGHC(A) 22, a family law dispute, the husband sought to admit post hearing communications. The High Court held that since these communications related to matters occurring after the date of the decision being appealed against, Ladd v Marshall did not apply. Instead, the issue was governed by Section 41(5) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 and the test to be applied was whether the further evidence would have a “perceptible impact on the decision such that it is in the interest of justice that it should be admitted”.
Donald Spencer